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Habeas Corpus in Peru: Myth and Reality
H. H. A. Cooper*
"Prayse is like a kind of paint. It makes everything seem better
than it really is." John Manningham
A WELL-ARGUED CASE for world habeas corpus is being increasingly
urged upon the international conscience, ever-plagued with abuses
against the most basic of human rights.' The idea, in theory, is attractive
and the seeming universality of habeas corpus or its equivalent in the
developed legal systems of the free world makes the extension of the
concept on an international scale both philosophically harmonious and
notionally practical. The purpose of the present article is not to criticize
the laudable project of those whose object is to secure better protection
for fundamental human rights, but rather to examine in detail the theory
and practice of habeas corpus in one Latin American country, Peru, and
to demonstrate that the greatest encroachments on human rights come
not from political tyranny, as is popularly imagined, but from the mal-
functioning of the legal system itself, against which even the most per-
fectly conceived habeas corpus is quite ineffective. It is trite but true
that a legal system is only as effective as the human agency engaged in
running it. It is sad to relate that, for all their apparent excellence on
paper, the majority of Peruvian laws, as anyone with but slight acquaint-
ance with the country can testify, are a dead letter. Of nothing is this
truer than of the law relating to habeas corpus in Peru.
History and Development of the Habeas Corpus in Peru
Peruvian habeas corpus has an extremely interesting, if somewhat
short history,2 having been introduced in 1897. Its sponsors and those
who opposed its introduction knew perfectly well what habeas corpus
was designed to protect, and the difficulties of making it work in the
socio-political and geographic context of Peru.3 Its English parentage is
unmistakable, but the doubts of those who declared themselves against
the importation of this bulwark of the common law were soundly based.
They understood well the philosophies of their countrymen and the dif-
ference between theory and practice. This is not to say that the attempt
to transplant the centuries-old concept of habeas corpus in the evolving
Peruvian legal system ought never to have been undertaken. What is
suggested here is that it ought not to have been undertaken so ideal-
istically; a lesson that might perhaps have wider significance in relation
* Visiting Prof. of Law, La Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos (Lima,
Peru) Facultad de Derecho; M.A., Liverpool; LL.B. (Hons.), London.
I See, e.g., Kutner, World Habeas Corpus: Ombudsman for Mankind, 24 U. MiUami L.
Rav. 352 (1970).
2 Cooper, Habeas Corpus in the Peruvian Legal System, XXX REVISTA DE DERECHO
Y CIENCIAS PoLrricAs 297-385 (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos 1967).
3 See, e.g., the interesting observation: "It is necessary to remember that we are, un-
fortunately, in a country where the llama is a means of communication." DIAo DE
LOS DEBATES (DisPUTADOS), CONGRESO ORDINARIO 661 (1892).
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to the movement for world habeas corpus. The result was that for the
first nineteen years of its life, Peruvian habeas corpus was virtually in-
effective against the abuses it had been meant to correct and, in the form
in which it was then legislated, satisfied no one, not even its sponsors. In
1916, however, Peruvian habeas corpus assumed the shape, which was to
distinguish it from other remedies of the same name and lineage and
which was to lead to endless arguments as to its true nature and a con-
fusion unresolved among jurists to this day. In short, Peru rolled cer-
tiorari, mandamus and habeas corpus up in the same bundle and called
it all habeas corpus.4 This splendid omnibus remedy was intended to
protect all classes of rights and interests, not merely the physical liberty
of the person, against all manner of official interference-a breathtaking-
ly ambitious extension of the concept for a country then racked with
internal dissension, which had deposed one president two years earlier
and was to depose another one two years hence.5 Nevertheless, the idea
stuck and in 1919, this augmented habeas corpus became enshrined for
the first time in a Peruvian constitution. No sooner had this precept been
enacted than Peru was plunged into the darkness of a bitterly repressive
dictatorship that was to last for eleven years, virtually the whole time
until the new constitution of 1933 was written. It is sufficient to say that
habeas corpus was quite ineffective in preventing the illegal detentions
and deportations of the Leguia regime. This occurred in 1920, the twi-
light of the Peruvian Supreme Court,6 which six years earlier had in-
spired much hope by its energetic upholding of human freedoms against
executive tyranny by means of habeas corpus.
In 1920, however, another more durable instrument, from the point
of view of habeas corpus, was promulgated. The 1920 Code of Criminal
Procedure of that year7 was in force until 1940 and, even now, its basic
structure lives on in the 1940 Code of Criminal Procedure, which is cur-
rently in force. In its treatment of habeas corpus, however, it is indeed
an extraordinary legal instrument, in that it seems to have forgotten all
about the extension of the concept that had been effected legislatively
a mere four years earlier.8 The Code of 1920 reiterates the classical con-
cept of habeas corpus as the supreme remedy for the protection of the
individual against arbitrary arrest and detention, and the procedural ma-
chinery is geared, exclusively, to this end. This is hardly surprising,
taking into account that its author was Dr. Mariano H. Cornejo, one of
the sponsors of the 1897 law and a staunch anglophile, who was roundly
defeated in his efforts to introduce jury trial as standard practice into
the Peruvian legal system. This inexplicable aberration caused great
4 See Cooper, Apuntes criticos sobre el Habeas Corpus en el Peru, 28 DEREdCo 5
(Pontificia Universidad Catolica del Peru 1970).
5 Cooper, supra note 2, at 310.
6 Id. at 315-316,
7 See Codigo de Procedimientos en Materia Criminal, LEGISLACION PERUANA (Lima,
1920), with Exposicion de Motivos by M. H. Comejo.
8 By means of the Ley 2223 of 1916. M. H. Cornejo was, curiously, one of the legis-
lators.
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confusion, as the amplified version of habeas corpus was now constitu-
tionally guaranteed, but there existed no procedural machinery to make
it effective. It is a measure of the unreal character of Peruvian habeas
corpus at this time that this deficiency was scarcely felt in practice. It
was, however, to cause further acute confusion in the future.
There was a real revolutionary spirit in the air when the Peruvian
constitution of 1933 was promulgated. A glance at the newspapers of the
time indicates very clearly, in the light of subsequent events, how the
cauldron of world affairs was bubbling and how improbable it was that
Peru should have escaped being caught up in this maelstrom of ideas.
In fact, Peru itself was in a ferment,9 and much of the constitution was
the product of vague, undefined enthusiasms rather than concrete, sen-
sible legislation in conformity with the country's needs. The provision
with regard to habeas corpus did nothing to clarify the earlier doubts,
and sowed new ones of even greater magnitude through the sincere, if
mistaken, desire of the sponsors of the project to provide an all-embrac-
ing, completely autonomous remedy for every class of infringement of
any of the individual or collective rights recognized by the constitution.
The problem lay in the fact that no such "action" had as yet been ac-
knowledged in existing Peruvian legislation; there was only the re-
curso, a purely criminal law concept in this particular field, the strict
and narrow rules for which were contained in the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of 1920.10 The uncertainty this caused among judges and prac-
tising lawyers is very apparent;" the real arguments among the aca-
demics (many of whom were or had been judges and practicising law-
yers) were to develop much later. It had been somehow assumed, as
happens so often in Peru, that the broad, general principle enunciated
in the constitution would receive detailed consideration, together with
a legislative exposition of the machinery necessary to make it effective,
very shortly after the adoption of the constitution."2 By this means it
was hoped to sort out the "criminal" and "civil" aspects of habeas corpus,
laying down the appropriate procedure for each. Nothing of the kind
ever happened and, by one of those not uncommon oversights of codi-
fiers', however experienced and enthusiastic, the earlier error repeated
itself uncorrected.
The Code of Criminal Procedure of 19401" has received high praise
from one well qualified to judge its merits.' 4 Nevertheless, it is not a new
9 The youthful APRA party gained legal representation in the Constituent Assembly
for the first time, but its representatives were expelled during the course of the
constitutional debate. The assassination of the constitutionally-elected president,
Sanchez Cerro, took place in the same year as the promulgation of the constitution.
10 Cooper, supra note 4, at 8.
11 See, e.g., Rebagliati, Garantias Constitucionales, 27 DERECHO 37 (Pontificia Uni-
versidad Catolica del Peru 1969).
12 See, e.g., art. 132 of the Constitution of 1839.
13 F. G. Ferrer, Codigo de Procedimientos Penales LEGISLACION PEBUANA (Lima, 1966);
for a general account in English, see Murray, A Comparative Study of Peruvian
Criminal Procedure, 21 U. MiAMI L. REv. 607 (1967).
14 See the article by Niceto Alcala-Zamora y Castillo, XXXI REVISTA DEL FoRo 339
(Lima 1939).
HABEAS CORPUS IN PERU 605
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
and original work, but rather an intended improvement on the old Code,
that of 1920, which it was designed to replace.15 In the matter of habeas
corpus this was most unfortunate, for the distinguished author of the
Code had not attended to developments since 1920 and, in particular, the
now well-established broadening of the concept. The matter was aggra-
vated by the fact that Dr. Zavala Loayza was patently dealing only with
criminal habeas corpus, yet the incongruity of what he was proposing
never seems to have occurred to him for an instant. Peru, only seven
years after the present constitution had been enacted, giving in the
broadest of terms a general "action" of habeas corpus to protect every
conceivable right recognized by the constitution itself, found itself with
procedural rules that were designed only for the protection, in the crim-
inal courts, of the physical liberty of the subject and the very terms of
the Code itself limited, once more, the concept to a mere recurso, a pro-
cedural device with none of the autonomy that the architects of the con-
stitution had intended. 16 That this was not a mere failure to take into
account the changes in the law, but rather a failure to understand their
purport, is conclusively proved by the direct reference to the constitu-
tional changes in the first article of the Code dealing with the granting
of habeas corpus.17 The inconvenient and, indeed, incongruous result is
that a procedure intended for the protection of the liberty of the subject,
with all the urgency implicit in the concept, became equally applicable
for the protection of other interests of a different nature altogether. The
very wording of the Code, as applied to such situations, is irrelevant and
the proceedings are incompatible with the end sought. This thoroughly
unsatisfactory situation persisted uncorrected until 1968, when the mili-
tary regime, which had recently assumed control of the country's affairs,
passed, not wholly disinterestedly, a measure designed to separate pro-
cedurally the civil and criminal aspects of habeas corpus.', Thereafter,
the civil remedy was to be more leisurely and governed by considerations
more clearly referable to the nature of the interests for which protection
was being sought. Like much of the legislation of the military regime
in its early days, it bears the marks of haste and does not really solve the
serious legal problems inherent in Peruvian habeas corpus. Interesting
though the civil aspects of habeas corpus may be, it is in the criminal
field that the real test of its usefulness in practical terms has to be made.
To this end, some detailed consideration of the Peruvian Code of Crim-
inal Procedure is necessary.
15 See Cooper, A Short History of Peruvian Criminal Procedure and. Institutions,
XXXII REVISTA DE DERECHO vY CIENCIAS POLrCAs 258 (Universidad Nacional Mayor
DE SAN MAscos 1968).
16 For a discussion of the technical aspects of this point, see Cooper, supra note 2, at
328-332.
17 Art. 349, CoDno DE PsocDImINros PENALES.
1 Decreto Ley 17083 of 24th October, 1968, was promulgated to "facilitate" the pro-
ceedings arising out of the expropriation of the Peruvian property at the Inter-
national Petroleum Co.
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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How the Habeas Corpus Works in Peru and its Failures
It is a strict rule of law in Peru that habeas corpus lies in every case
where a person has been detained for more than twenty-four hours with-
out having rendered his declaration before the examining magistrate.19
This declaration, the instructiva or "confession" as it is sometimes
termed, is of prime importance in the Peruvian criminal proceedings. 2
It might well be described, without exaggeration, as the very basis of the
whole process. The confession is obligatory and, later, at the trial, it will
be read to the accused and he will be questioned on its contents. The
law lays down that the principal object of the preventive detention of the
accused person is to ensure that this declaration is duly rendered.
21
Moreover, it is expressly established that this declaration must be ren-
dered, or at least started, within twenty-four hours of arrest,22 and in the
case of twenty-four hours having passed without the taking of this decla-
ration, the obligation is imposed upon the head of the establishment
where the detainee is held, to take him, without further delay, before
the examining magistrate. 23 There are serious penalties attaching to the
breach of these provisions. 24 As an additional safeguard, the commence-
ment of the criminal process must be reported to the trial court,25 which
is charged with a supervisory role in all aspects relating to the conduct
of the investigation. As though these measures were thought insufficient
in themselves to guarantee the rights of the subject, there is the Minis-
terio Publico,26 which, acting through its Fiscales and Agentes Fiscales,
oversees the work of the judges at every level, acts as public prosecutor
and generally protects the public interest in the administration of justice
according to law. One would say, with such a powerful apparatus, that
there was little possibility of arbitrary detention or abuse of the subject's
rights. Habeas corpus would provide a speedy and effective remedy. It
is very sad to have to report that this, in practice, is very far from being
the case. There is an unfortunate tendency in the realm of descriptive,
comparative legal studies to judge the effectiveness of a system by refer-
ence to the theoretical perfection of its precepts. It is to be remembered
that one cannot really tell where a shoe pinches until one comes to
wear it.
In matters of habeas corpus, this professional myopia is allied with
another sentiment, which, more than any other, tends to pervert the true,
academic objectivity, which ought to be brought to bear in an enquiry of
this sort. Habeas corpus is thought of largely, and quite erroneously, in
political terms. Its value or ineffectiveness is judged by reference to the
19 Art. 349, ComlaO DE PRocFInnrros PENALES.
20 See DOMINGO GARCIA RADA, LA INSTIUCION 287 et seq. (Lima 1967).
21 Art. 83, CODIGO DE PROCEDIMENTOS PENALES.
22 Art. 85 CODIGO PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES; supra note 20 at 111, 112.
23 Art. 86 CODIGO DE PROCEDrmIENTOs PENALES.
24 Art. 340, CODIGO PENAL, and arts. 353-356, CoDIO DE PROCEDrMIENTOS PENALES.
25 Art. 88, CoDIGo DE PROCESIMIENTOS PENALES.
26 Cooper, anpra note 15, at 261. See Cooper, The Administration of Justice in Peru,
53 JuDicATuRE 339 (1970); Cooper, El Minesterio Publico, XXXIV, REVISrA DE DEaECHo
Y CIENCIAS PoLrriCAs 205 (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos 1970).
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number of political prisoners in any particular country, and their treat-
ment in the matter of basic human rights.27 The falsity of this yardstick
is clearly demonstrable in the case of Peru, where it can be said, with
absolute justification, that there are no political prisoners28 and, conse-
quently, none of the well publicized abuses as in Greece, Haiti and the
Iron Curtain countries. Theoretically, in Peru, there exists the rule of
law, guaranteed by a liberal constitution, a strong Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure and independent courts, with a whole armory of weapons at their
disposal for the protection of every class of human rights. Neither the
ordinary visiting academic nor the most assiduous student of the coun-
try's legal literature can become aware of the true position. In fact, as
a protection of basic human rights, the elaborate structure described is
quite useless and habeas corpus, in itself, is of no practical value as a
guarantee against arbitrary detention and procedural irregularities, how-
ever grave. These are most serious charges, made unhesitatingly and
without fear of contradiction. In every case, what fails is the human ele-
ment. No campaign for the better protection of human rights can afford
to ignore these realities. There are certain hard facts of life, which are
known only to those who have had direct contact with the problems.
These facts are not prominent in the official records and are never allud-
ed to in learned publications. For the purposes of the present article,
they must be stated unequivocally.
Thousands of ordinary persons accused of common crimes are regu-
larly kept for quite long periods in police detention without being placed
at the disposition of the investigating magistrate in flat defiance of the
law. This is the usual, indeed, the invariable practice, in the case of
minor criminals, a fact readily verifiable by direct enquiry. The fact is
confirmed, when one knows what to look for, by examination of the case
papers and a comparison of the date on which the police investigation
was opened with that on which the first declaration was rendered before
the examining magistrate. At times the facts of important cases become
notorious through publicity. Three cases are worth mentioning to illus-
trate the point.
In February and March, 1968, a massive fraud in the Customs
Branch of the Lima Post Office was discovered.29 As a result, a number
of customs officers were arrested, and some spent forty-six days in a po-
lice precinct without having been placed at the disposition of the exam-
ining magistrate or rendering the declaration required by law. It may
be accounted somewhat extraordinary that the public prosecutor, whose
duty is to bring such irregularities to the notice of the court, should have
referred to this fact in quite a different sense in the course of his accu-
27 This is particularly the case of those who argue for the extension of habeas
corpus in the international field. See, e.g. Kutner, supra note 1, and the material
cited therein.
28 The PEUviAN CasamnAL CODE, unlike those of some other countries, for example,
Mexico, does not contain a definition, even by inference, of the delito "political-
social," so that it is very difficult to say who is detained on political grounds. In the
event, a general amnesty was granted to all political prisoners on 23rd December,
1970.
209 Expediente No. 431/70, 2d TamurrAL CoRmsccioNAL, Lima.
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sation, alleging that the defense put forward by some of the accused was
fabricated during this illegal detention.
In January, 1970, two members of a very prominent Peruvian family
were arrested as the result of the disappearance of the sum of 690,000
U.S. dollars from a bank account, which had passed from private to pub-
lic control as a consequence of the agrarian reform of July, 1969. The
case had very obvious political implications, and the government had a
direct financial interest in the matter, but the offenses alleged were
common larceny and falsification. Nevertheless, these two people, plus
a third, were held for many days in police custody before finally being
placed at the disposition of the examining magistrate. Habeas corpus,
which clearly lay in this case, was solicited and denied.30
On the 15th of December, 1970, a particularly brutal homicide took
place in Lima, followed four days later by a double suicide, the circum-
stances of which attracted considerable notice and speculation. A sus-
pect was taken into custody on the 19th of December, and the police
investigation proceeded in a blaze of publicity prejudicial even by Peru-
vian standards. The suspect was not handed over to the examining mag-
istrate until the 29th of December.
31
The purpose and effect of these illegal detentions need little expla-
nation. In each of these cases, habeas corpus was the remedy designed
to correct the abuse. In these and thousands of similar cases, it is in-
effective despite the theoretical perfection of the Peruvian system. Only
experience and a profound study of Peruvian law in action can show
why this should be so.
Before going on to suggest, in concrete terms, an answer to this
poser, a detailed analysis of two cases will reveal the practical deficien-
cies in Peruvian criminal law and the inability to do anything about them
by means of habeas corpus. The Peruvian citizen is an extremely well-
documented individual. Provided he is honest, he will have at least
three documents of identity,3 2 possibly many more. Every time he needs
an official document of any kind, he will have to obtain a certificate of
residence from his local police precinct. By the time he reaches the age
of majority he will have given his fingerprints many times over with an
abandon that would make an Englishman shudder and many a common
law chief justice turn in his grave. It would seem very difficult, there-
fore, that a person might find himself, inadvertently, in the toils of the
law through a simple case of mistaken identity, in a purely documentary
sense. It is even more incredible that anyone, in a country that relies so
heavily on the written process, should have spent six months in prison
on that account and might well have spent very much longer. Yet this
is exactly what happened.
In the early days of January, 1970, Victor Garcia Flores33 was picked
up by the police as a vagrant. He bad committed no crime and the only
30 The case had been duly reported to the Juez Instructor de Turno, el Senor Martin
Figueroa, but he had not taken the instructivas in the time allowed by law.
31 This case is particularly grave as the charge carried the death penalty, and the
obligation of the examining magistrate was to carry out the investigation in the
strictest reserve; art. 73 CODIGO DE PROcEDInnENTOS.
52 Libreta electoral; libreta militar; libreta tributaria. Many ordinary transactions
cannot be carried out without the production of one or other of these documents.
33 See El Peruano, 8th of June and 20th of June, 1970.
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brush he had had previously with the law had resulted in a six month
sentence for larceny in 1961. On consulting their records, the standard
procedure in these cases, the police found that there was a court order
for the arrest of one Victor Garcia Flores for a matter then pending in
the Fifth Tribunal Correccional of Lima.3 4 In vain, the arrested man
averred there must be some mistake. Without more ado, and without
ever having seen a judge of any kind, he was packed off to prison to
await the slow, grinding processes of the Peruvian judicial mill. It is
important to note that, if this individual had been the Victor Garcia
Flores cited in the judicial order, which was the only basis for his de-
tention, habeas corpus would not lie. Nor is there any reason why it
should. The protection of the subject in such cases lies, notionally, in
other remedies. Nevertheless, in neither case would he see or be seen
by a judge before being committed to prison; he is held, often for years,
on a piece of paper that might or might not be in order. The arrested
man in the present case was clearly not the person named in the pro-
ceedings; his physical characteristics and personal history were quite
different. The fingerprints of both men were on record. Instead of a
speedy release with the appropriate apologies, the unfortunate Victor
Garcia Flores was consigned to prison, presumably to await a trial that
was unlikely to be held for a long time, if at all. Meanwhile, unscrupu-
lous court officials began to bleed anxious relatives white on the pretext
of securing the detained man's release.
3 5
It is curious that none of the persons consulted saw this as a proper
case for the use of habeas corpus. This simple fact tells much about the
degeneration of the remedy and its lack of practical application among
members of the Lima Bar. All the elements required by law were pres-
ent: 36 The detained man was, on proof of his identity, not subject to any
criminal proceeding that had been initiated against him; he had been de-
tained more than twenty-four hours without being placed at the dispo-
sition of the examining magistrate; his detention had not been ordered
by a judge or competent court; he was not under sentence or subject to
military law. After suffering five months detention in this condition, with
the prospect of this illegal situation continuing indefinitely, habeas corpus
was finally presented on his behalf.
Now habeas corpus in all countries where it exists is the most expe-
ditious of remedies, and Peru, theoretically, is no exception. The Code
of Criminal Procedure lays down that in the case of habeas corpus pre-
34 The judges of these Tribunals Correccionales, the Vocales, change each Judicial
year. In the year in question, the personnel of this Tribunal did not enjoy a very
satisfactory reputation, one judge being dismissed from the judiciary and the Pres-
ident and the remaining judge being suspended without salary for two months on a
later occasion.
35 This is the rule rather than the exception in Peru, but it is, as a practical matter,
impossible to contain as it is a serious crime to suborn judicial officials. Notionally,
the judges have, in virtue of the Ley Arganica del Poder Judicial of 1963, oversight
of their subordinates and adequate disciplinary powers. In practice, without influ-
ence, it is impossible to reach the judges themselves as one must first pass these
minor officials. If one has the requisite influence one does not encounter the diffi-
culties indicated: vicious circle.
36 Art. 351, CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES.
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sented directly before the Tribunal Correccional, that court may refer
the matter for investigation to an examining magistrate, who shall pro-
ceed immediately to the place of detention and, if he finds that the mat-
ters alleged are true, order the release of the detained person.3 7 The
habeas corpus in the present case had to pass the very same officials re-
sponsible for the corrupt practices that were blocking the subject's re-
lease. The presentation of this petition, moreover, was extremely embar-
rassing to the court itself. Had it been processed in the normal way, it
might have served not merely as an awkward precedent but as a per-
manent record of the court's own blameworthiness at a particularly sen-
sitive time for the judiciary.38 For over a fortnight nothing was done,
then, without any explanation, the subject was released by order of the
Tribunal Correccional. Some days later, the habeas corpus, which now
had no basis, was summarily dismissed. Undoubtedly, it had served its
purpose for all the irregularities that attended its consideration by the
authorities.
The other case is even more revealing of the fundamental defects
from which the Peruvian criminal process suffers in practice. It is peril-
ously easy for a certain class of person to find himself taken into custody
in Peru; getting released is often a very difficult and always a time-
consuming process. The wildest of accusations are sometimes made and
acted on by the authorities, 39 often as a result of bribery at the lowest
levels. A person caught up in such toils of corruption has usually no
alternative but to "settle" the matter while it is in the hands of the police
or suffer for his principles. Once again, the theoretical perfection of the
system should be noted: the false accusation is punishable as a crime,
40
and there are adequate procedural devices for bringing this situation to
the notice of the courts. In theory, the accused person must, by law, be
brought within twenty-four hours before an examining magistrate, who
will personally 41 investigate the charge and, if he finds it to be without
merit, liberate the subject without further delay. If the matter is more
complicated, he may retain the suspect in custody for a maximum of ten
days, during any of which he can release the prisoner on his own respon-
sibility on being satisfied that the charges are without foundation. 42 By
the tenth day, the examining magistrate must either order the detention
of the subject for the whole of the period of the investigation, which for
practical purposes means until he is tried, or order his unconditional re-
lease.43 In the majority of cases, bail is not permissible. By law, the
maximum period allowed for the investigation of any offence is six
37 Art. 352, CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES.
38 Decreto Lay 18060, Dec. 24, 1969.
39 Very often as the result of a sensationalist, mal-intentioned newspaper campaign,
which leaves the judge little alternative but to act precipitately or appear grossly
negligent before an avid but ill-informed public.
40 Arts, 186 & 330 CoDIGo PENAL.
41 See the Circular of the Corte Suprema, Oct. 28, 1942.
42 Art. 83, CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTOS PENALES.
43 Art. 84, CODIGO DE PRocEDImIEFNTos PENALES.
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months;44 in some cases, this period is ninety days.45 In practice, this
period is subject to innumerable extensions through the incompleteness
of the investigation when the case papers are sent up to the trial court,
and it is not uncommon, despite the strictest rules to the contrary, for
the investigation to be extended without the requisite authorization.
Periods of two- or three-years pre-trial detention are common.
There exists a variety of remedies for this situation, all of which
consist, fundamentally, of a complaint to the trial court and, if nothing
is done, of a further complaint to the Supreme Court, which has exten-
sive disciplinary powers over all judges. These remedies are, in fact,
almost never used. The instruccion or period of judicial investigation is
of supreme importance in determining the fate of an accused person.
The trial itself turns largely upon an interpretation of the material
elicited at this early stage.4e It is no exaggeration to say that those who
have had no defense or a poor defense at this stage of the proceedings
are doomed from the start. Consideration of the case now to be de-
scribed must proceed from this standpoint.
On the 13th of March, 1969, Porfirio Lara Altamirano, 4T a Quechua-
speaking native of the highlands of the interior was in Lima with his
"common law" wife. While in a chemist's shop making a purchase, they
overhead a woman asking the assistant for an abortifacient. Outside the
shop, the woman accosted them and struck up a conversation, in the
course of which she accompanied the couple, uninvited, for some dis-
tance. The couple was very obviously provincials and neither spoke
Spanish well (in fact, Lara's companion did not speak to the woman at
all). They all shared a colectivo, a taxi-type conveyance common in
Lima, to a destination outside the city, during the course of which the
woman made advances to Lara, asked him for money and insinuated that
he leave his companion and take up with her instead. Lara made it clear
that these attentions were unwelcome, but on arriving at their destina-
tion, a small village outside Lima, the couple was disconcerted by the
fact that the strange woman continued to follow them and had started to
become cruelly abusive. She then began to throw stones at the couple,
who responded in kind, whereupon she departed. While the couple was
making their way along the road some short while later, a police patrol
car drew up and took Lara into custody. He was taken to a nearby po-
lice post, where the strange woman, whose identity he never learned,
accused him of having stolen from her the sum of 2,000 soles (approxi-
mately 47 U.S. dollars) and having twice sexually assaulted her. The
couple was searched in the police post and finding nothing incriminating
on either of them, Lara's companion, who spoke no Spanish and seems
to have been of very low intelligence, was released and promptly dis-
appeared. Lara was kept in police custody for two days, during which he
44 Art. 202, CoDiGo D PROCEDAIENTOS PENALES.
45 For example, in the case of certain offences against the Customs and tax laws, and
certain sexual offences.
46 See Cooper supra note 15, at 259-260.
47 Expm'mmrn No. 312/69.
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was threatened and abused and made to sign a number of papers which
he did not understand at all. Meanwhile, his accuser, also detained, was
submitted to a number of indignities and begged to let the whole matter
drop. Exactly what happened to her in the police post is a matter for con-
jecture, but she was eventually released and was never seen again.
Lara was placed at the disposition of the Ist Juzgado de Instruccior
of Lima on the 15th of March, 1969. He should, theoretically, have been
brought immediately before the examining magistrate, who, had he
been conscientious, 4 would have found, on the evidence, no grounds for
proceedings. In this case, as in 90% of similar cases, Lara neither saw
the examining magistrate, nor gave his declaration according to law with
the appropriate safeguards of legal representation. This declaration,
which the law regards as so important that it cannot even be delegated
to another judge of equal rank, was taken in Lara's case by the escribano,
the examining magistrate's clerk and passed up later for the judge to
sign. Thus, Lara had no opportunity to bring the injustice of his case
before a magistrate competent to enquire into it and to order his imme-
diate release. He was, instead, remitted to prison and absolutely nothing
was done in his case for the simple reason that his accuser had dis-
appeared.
Had the case followed its normal course, it is quite probable that
Lara would have been detained for a very long time. Flimsy though the
accusation was, it is even possible that the matter might have gone for
trial. The real problem, as in so many of these cases, lay in the fact that
Lara could not afford a lawyer. Although he was entitled to the services
of a court-appointed lawyer,49 in practice these never take an interest
in the case unless the accused person or his family is prepared to pay.
During Lara's custody, the only investigative act was the initial taking
of his declaration by the clerk. In September, 1969, a habeas corpus was
presented, based on the irregularities of his detention and the consequent
infringement of his constitutional rights. The argument was that a
"competent magistrate" had not taken the declaration, in contravention
of Article 121 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since this very argu-
ment could open the gates for perhaps 90% of all prisoners held in pre-
ventive custody in Peru, its "inconvenience" is obvious. The result, as in
the case discussed earlier, was that after some days hesitation, Lara
was released and the proceedings in his case discontinued.
Conclusion
These two cases are, unfortunately, the rule rather than the excep-
tion. They reveal a state of affairs that habeas corpus is quite unable to
correct, and the relative success of the remedy in these two instances
may be fairly attributed to the very audacity of its employment, which
48 The Juez Instructor, by reason of Art. 77, Corneo DE PrtoCEDnI&ENTOS PINALES, has
very wide powers as to whether he will open a judicial investigation at all. Having
done so, he is obliged to continue it according to law, but he has sufficiently wide
powers, nevertheless, to place in liberty an accused person, during the first ten
without reference to any other authority, if he is convinced that the accusations are
without merit.
49 See Arts. 67-71, Comm DE PaocEDnMENTos PENALES.
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
614 20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
clearly threw the system off balance. Certain general conclusions may
be drawn and these serve not merely as a measure of the effectiveness
of habeas corpus in Peru, but also as a test of the conditions necessary
for the effectiveness of this remedy in any given legal system.
There must exist a strong and incorruptible legal profession, not
merely to appreciate the technical aspects of the situations in which
habeas corpus might lie, but rather to provide the dynamic without
which the remedy remains purely academic. The legal profession must
be capable of exerting real force upon the collective judicial conscience
for habeas corpus to be an effective protection of the subject's rights.50
Yet it is precisely in those countries where, according to its protagonists,
world habeas corpus is most needed, that the legal profession is at its
weakest and most subservient.5 ' In Peru, on the surface, the profession
is independent and well organized. For reasons that only a person who
has studied the problem profoundly can understand, this independence
of attitude and action is quite illusory.52 It is the counterpart of other
professional attitudes, less pronounced, in other parts of the world, which
combine to frustrate the effectiveness of legal remedies such as habeas
corpus. To be effective as a remedy, as the case of Peru clearly shows,
the interests of justice must be placed above self or profession. In a
country like Peru, there is no inducement for this to be done and the
lawyer, who sees himself as a crusader of sorts in this field, is likely to
bring opprobrium on himself at best and ostracism or more serious pro-
fessional disasters at worst. For the proper safeguard of the subject, it
is essential that the presentation of habeas corpus be not at the mercy
of timorous professionals, who in a moment of crisis might weigh their
own convenience against the liberty of the petitioner. In Peru there is
no lack, even in times of danger, of lawyers willing to risk themselves
and their reputations in the presentation of habeas corpus in political
cases.53 There are obvious compensations as well as risks. What is lack-
ing is the energy or desire to use habeas corpus in the cases in which it
is most needed, of which those discussed are typical examples. The
effectiveness of habeas corpus must be judged on this basis rather than
on the notional one that has tended to prevail in circles where this rem-
edy is most discussed. Habeas corpus in Peru will continue to be a pure-
ly paper remedy until lawyers force the police to comply with their legal
obligation to place suspects before the examining magistrate in every
case within twenty-four hours. This is the proper field of habeas corpus
50 For reasons which can only be adequately explained at length in a work devoted
exclusively to the subject, it may be stated that the effect of the legal profession
upon the collective legal conscience in Peru is negligible. The judges have no real
respect for or fear of the Bar as an entity, a fact which has a profound effect upon
the administration of justice generally.
51 See, e.g., Cooper, Diez ensayos sobre el Common Law, EroRAL UmvElso, 47
(1967).
52 In Peru, all documents presented at any stage of a legal proceeding must be
signed by a lawyer. It is a fact, that no lawyer can be found in many cases to submit
a complaint, however justified, for fear of the consequences this might have on his
professional prospects.
53 See, e.g., the case Dr. Anibal Aliaga Imparraguirre. 6 BoLrm CoLEG DE
ADOGADOS 233 (1970).
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and, as even the most superficial of studies will show, it is virgin terri-
tory for lawyers in Peru. It is probable that habeas corpus has simply
become too sophisticated, in Peru, for everyday use.
54
Equally, it is safe to assert that habeas corpus is of little or no value
where bench and bar are venal and corrupt. There are a great many
situations in Peru where habeas corpus is the proper remedy to safe-
guard the liberty of the subject, but attempts to use it are frustrated by
these unhealthy combinations, the only object of which is to save the re-
sponsibility of those against whom it would run. It is sadly true that, in
Peru, the detention of the client is regarded all too often as the lawyer's
lien for his fees. This unsatisfactory attitude has infected the adminis-
tration of justice to such an extent that the majority of criminal lawyers
are cruelly indifferent to the plight of their clients or are cynically con-
tent that their fees are thus secured. To think of habeas corpus in such
a tainted atmosphere is absurdly incongruent. It may be said that
habeas corpus is only effective where there exists a real concern among
the legal profession for the liberty of the subject. Where, instead, there
exists a calculated or cynical indifference,55 habeas corpus cannot play
any sort of role in the safeguarding of basic human rights and becomes,
as it is in Peru, a pretty, juristic ornament, serving only to deceive the
unwary or ill-prepared student of the legal sciences. A good lawyer, with
a sound professional conscience, never lacks the right remedy. It is not
only a battery of procedural devices that are needed to safeguard human
rights but also a certain spirit among lawyers themselves. It is this,
rather than the formal aspects of habeas corpus, that has served to give
this remedy its unique character in the common law and it is precisely
this dynamic quality which is lacking, presently, in Peru. This, obvious-
ly, cannot be supplied by legislation; what is wanted is a thoroughgoing
change of heart and mind.56 Perhaps even more important than an hon-
est, aggressive spirit at the bar, is the real independence of the bench.
Despite appearances, this is totally lacking in Peru, an assertion pain-
fully easy to demonstrate. Once more, this lack of independence is not
of prime importance in "political" issues, but rather in attitudes towards
commonplace matters. The timorous, retiring attitude of the judges has
reduced habeas corpus in Peru to a mere cypher.57 Seen in purely for-
54 In marked contrast to the famous aphorism of Maitland, in which he attributed
the continuing vigour of the common law precisely to this quality of not having be-
come too "fine" for everyday use.
55 The only adequate comparison wtih the Peruvian attitude to habeas corpus, en-
countered by the author, finds expression in the irreverent words of J. D. Passos,
"My ass to Habeas Corpus". 42nd PArATauL, CARDINAL at 109.
56 That these are not simply the strictures of a disappointed foreign observer may be
seen from some of the more outspoken criticisms that appear in print from time to
time. See, for example, La reforma judicial, by Alfonso Carpio Alcocer (a recent
unsuccessful candidate for a judgeship) published in ULTrhTA HORA, 27th January,
1971. The article contains serious factual errors, but the criticism, coming from a
prominent, practising member of the Lima Bar are valid. He mentions, incidentally,
the case of a foreigner who spent 12 years among Peru's worst criminals on the
island of El Fronton because he had no documents. And Habeas Corpus?
57 A perfect example is afforded by the case of Don Julio Eduardi Fontecilla Rojas,
a Chilean national, son-in-law of General Viaux, a suspect in the case of the shoot-
(Continued on next page)
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mal, constitutional terms, the Peruvian judiciary is independent on a
functional footing; the matter is not ordinarily put to the test on great
questions of state. In fact, judged on the basis of everyday matters, the
judges, almost without exception, are seen to be self-serving to a quite
extraordinary degree. This is the true and realistic test of judicial inde-
pendence and, by it, Peru's judges fail notably. It is by this test that the
value of world habeas corpus, too, must be measured.
(Continued from preceding page)
ing, in Chile, of General Schneider. This individual entered Peru, legally, in Novem-
ber, 1970, but his detention was requested by the Chilean authorities. He was ar-
rested and a most curiously worded order for his expulsion was made on the 9th
November, 1970. His wife brought habeas corpus proceedings to challenge the
validity of the order. On the 26th January, 1971, the matter came, at last, before the
Tribunal de Vacaciones "B", but was not attended to, "For las recargardas labores
del Tribunal": El Peruano, 27th January, 1971 at 8. In fact, the only work done by
the Tribunal that day was to continue two trials of comparatively slight importance,
as is testified by the official publication to which reference is made.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/18
